Studies use different conceptual and operational definitions of crises. The different crisis identifications can lead to inconsistent conclusions and policy formulation even if the same analytical framework is applied.
Quantitative Analysis of Crisis: Crisis Identification and Causality

Introduction
This paper analyzes crises in emerging economies on a cross-country and time -series basis. Different types of crises across countries and periods are examined using the same approach, which enables us to identify crises objectively and to measure the depth and length of crises consistently.
Most studies focus mainly on a few types of crises such as banking and currency crises for international comparison. However, since the 1990s multi-dimensional crises in which different crisis types occur simultaneously have become more prevalent. Therefore the narrow focus on crisis types may not capture this important aspect of recent crises. In contrast, studies dealing with more than a few types of crises tend to be country specific and qualitative, and not necessarily suitable for international comparison. In addition, most studies use annual data which often cannot adequately capture the rapid developments of different crisis types.
Further, existing studies use different crisis definitions a nd accordingly they have different crisis identifications. Even if the same analytical framework is applied, the different identifications may lead to contrasting conclusions in crisis related studies.
This may in turn lead to inconsistent policy recommendations. Therefore if different crisis types can be compared across countries and periods using the same approach, crises can be more clearly identified and the characteristics of different crises can be better understood.
Seven crisis types in 15 emerging economies between Q1 1980 and Q4 2002 are examined in this paper.
As one of the most important common features of crises is an 'abrupt' change in economic indicators, standardized scores are used to identify crisis periods. Then, two sets of rules are applied to identify crisis episodes, which are a core part of crisis periods. As a result 59 crisis episodes are identified. Afterwards, in order to clarify the transmission mechanism between crises, Granger causality tests are conducted for five Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand).
Crisis Identification
Literature Review
There is no consensus on definitions of different types of crises despite their frequency in development economics. While conceptual definitions are generally agreed on, operational definitions are more controversial. A conceptual definition is an entry point for crisis identification or a descriptive expression of a crisis. An operational definition divides crisis and non-crisis periods. Accordingly, it requires an indicator and threshold. The operational definition should of course be consistent with the conceptual definition. Existing studies on crises mainly focus on five crisis types such as balance of payments, banking, currency, debt and financial crises. However, each study uses different conceptual and operational definitions for the same crisis type. As a result, crisis identifications differ in each study, although some of the difference stems from choices of sample periods and countries.
Balance of Payments Crises
Balance of payments crises are conceptually defined as 'an abrupt loss of international reserves'. Krugman and Obstfeld (1997, p.504 ) define balance of payments crises as "a sharp change in official foreign reserves s parked by a change in expectations about the future exchange rate." Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, p.12 ) define balance of payments crises as "reserves are lost abruptly and currency pegs abandoned."
However, an operational definition of balance of payments crises to identify the abrupt loss of reserves is rarely found.
Banking Crises
Banking crises are conceptually defined as "a period in which significant segment of the banking system become illiquid or insolvent. " (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2000, p.4) (1) According to this conceptual definition, banking crises possess liquidity and solvency aspects. Further, liquidity crises occur "when a bank cannot
honor its immediate contractual obligations to its creditors, even though its net value is positive. That is, it
does not have funds to meet the withdrawal of deposits at a given point in time, although over time it would be able to do so." (Kumar, Masson and Miller, 2000, p.4) Solvency crises refer to a situation where "the bank's liabilities exceed its assets in present-value and the bank is effectively bankrupt." (ibid, p.4) In terms of an operational definition there are mainly four approaches such as asset, liability, capital account and government assistance approaches. The asset approach that focuses on the quality of asset and non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio is often used as an indicator (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) ). The liability approach focuses on the liability side of banks' balance sheet. The essence of this approach is the incidence of bank runs. Glick and Hutchison (1999, p.8) Therefore, the actual banking crisis identification depends on which approach is used.
Currency Crises
Currency crises are conceptually defined as an abrupt depreciation of the currency. For example, Glick and Hutchison (1999, p.6 ) define currency crises conceptually as "large changes in some indicators of actual or potential currency values." A critical point on which some studies disagree is whether to include unsuccessful currency attacks. Supporters of the inclusion propose to construct a currency pressure index composed of exchange rates, interest rates and reserves, since they argue that a country can defend currency crises by increasing interest rates and/or intervening in the markets by selling international reserves.
Operationally, the treatment of currency depreciation under hyperinflation is another important issue. Frank and Rose (1996) identify currency crises on an annual basis when a currency depreciates more than 25 percent from the previous year and the depreciation rate should be higher than the previous year by more than 10 percent to exclude currency depreciation associated with hyperinflation. Others (for example, Esquivel and Larrain (1998) ) use real exchange rates to exclude the impacts of hyperinflation. Goldfajn and Gupta (1999, pp.5-6) attempt to distinguish currency crises by measuring the departure of the actual real exchange rate from an estimated equilibrium real exchange rate. The authors use a Hodrick-Prescott filtered series to measure the deviation from the actual exchange rates.
Debt Crises
The widely accepted conceptual definition of external debt crises is as "inability of debtors to make timely payments of interests and principals." (Dornbusch, 1989, p.301) There are few challenges on this conceptual definition.
However, operationally, it is difficult how to define 'inability'. There are two approaches. threshold is to rule out cases in which the share of debt in default is negligible, while the second criterion is to include countries that are not technically in arrears because they reschedule or restructure their obligations before defaulting. There are numerous external debt indicators such as the debt to GDP ratio, the debt to exports ratio and the debt service ratio. Ajayi (1997, p.9) asserts that debt burden and the servicing capacity of external debt are shown primary by five indicators: (i) the debt to exports ratio, (ii) the debt to GNP ratio, (iii) the debt service to exports ratio, (iv) the interest to exports ratio, and (v) the interest to GNP ratio.
Among the five indicators, the author views that the debt service to exports ratio as well as the debt service to GNP (GDP) ratio are useful indices of solvency.
Financial Crises
Despite its frequency especially in the late 1990s, there is still no consensus on a conceptual definition on financial crises. Accordingly there are few operational definitions. Some studies argue that financial crises are a combination of different types of crises. For example, Aziz et al. (2000, p.5) explain that "financial crisis may be grouped into three broad categories: currency crises, banking crises, and foreign debt crises."
On the other hand, others define financial crises as "potentially severe disruptions of financial markets that, by impairing markets ability to function effectively, can have large adverse effects on the real economy" (IMF, 1998, p.75) and "a nonlinear disruption to financial markets…" (Mishkin, 1997 , p.38) Caprio (1998 argues that "financial crises regularly originate in or induce insolvency in the banking system, and feature a collapse in asset prices, most often in equity and securities markets" but the same author further asserts (ibid, p.4) "a financial crisis usually involves a corporate debt problem in the nonblank financial sector, in other words, banks and other intermediaries usually do not get into trouble if borrowers can easily service their debt." Sachs and Woo (2000, p.13) state that "financial crises are characterized by an abrupt and significant shift from net capital inflows to net capital outflow from one year to the next."
The differences in crisis identifications mainly come from three sources. First, if a conceptual definition differs, the resulting operational definition is likely to differ as well. As a result, the operational definition inevitably leads to different crisis identifications. Second, many studies especially banking cris is studies directly refer to other studies' crisis identifications or just combine different studies' identifications regardless of the differences in conceptual definitions. For example, Hutchison and Neuberger (2002, p.9 ) combine crisis episodes of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
Alternative Crisis Identification Approach
A conceptual definition should best describe characteristics of crises, and an operational definition identifies crises by using an appropriate indicator and threshold. If the indicator exceeds the threshold this is the start of crises and vice versa. The periods exceeding the threshold are crisis periods and the gap between the threshold and the indicator is a degree of the crisis (Fig. 1) . The second approach, for example, is that if the external debt to GDP ratio of a certain period, say 't', exceeds 'y' years average by 'z' times standard deviation, this period is identified as debt crises. The second approach or the deviation from a trend allows comparing various crisis indicators on the same scale. Further, this approach can capture an ' abrupt' change in an indicator which i s one of the most important characteristics of crises. In contrast, a drawback of this approach is that it identifies crises regardless of an absolute level.
To measure the deviation from a trend, the first step is to convert indicators into standardized scores.
The second step is to compare standardized scores with a common threshold. If standardized scores exceed the threshold in a certain period, this period is identified as a crisis period. This crisis identification method is commonly used to identify currency crises. (4) To calculate a standardized score (Z), first the gap between the value (X) and mean (µ) is calculated, and then the deviation is divided by the standard deviation (d)
Standardized scores follow normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1990) . Standardized scores show how many times of standard deviations the value is away from the mean. For example, when a standardized score of an indicator is 1.0, this means the indicator is away from the mean by 1.0 standard deviation and the probability of exceeding 1.0 is 15.9 percent. In this article , standardized scores are calculated on a moving average basis so that a change in sample periods does not affect the crisis and non-crisis identification. For example, if a standardized score of period (Z t ) is calculated by an indicator of (X t ), the mean of periods (1…t), and the standard deviation of periods (1…t), a standardized score of the next period (Z t+1 ) is calculated by an indicator of (X t+1 ), the mean of periods (2…t+1), and the standard deviation of periods (2…t+1).
Choices of sample periods for standardized scores and the threshold are arbitrary. In currency crisis studies adopting this methodology, the threshold ranges from 1.5 to 3.0 and few logical explanations on the choices of thresholds are found. The lower the threshold is the more crisis periods are identified. This analysis uses 2.0 as the threshold, since this is about an average of currency crisis studies, and then the probability to exceed 2.0 is 2.5 percent. Regarding sample periods, this analysis uses five years so that the number of sample data becomes 20 on a quarterly basis, since the minimum number of data for an analysis is 20 as a rule of thumb.
As shows in Fig. 1 , the degree of crisis is measured by the combination of the length of crisis periods and depths. The depth of a crisis in period (t) is the standardized score of period (t) when exceeding threshold (2.0). As such, the total degree of a crisis episode is measured by the following equation (2), and two sets of conditions to identify a crisis episode is further explained in section 2.4.
where a it is a crisis depth of (m) different type of crises (i >2.0) at the period of t and n is the length of a crisis episode. Equation (2) shows that the degree of a crisis episode is determined by the length, the depth and the number of crisis types involved.
Multidimensional Aspects of Crises
One of the most important characteristics of recent crises is multidimensionality in which several types of crises occur simultaneously and/or one type of crises affects other crisis types within a short period.
Although most crisis studies focus on five types of crises such as banking, balance of payments, currency, debt and financial crises, few studies handle all fives types of crises together and existing studies miss other important types of crises. This article includes growth rate crises, and banking crises is divided into liquidity type banking crises and solvency type banking crises. Accordingly this article deals with seven types of crises. A change in growth rates affects other crisis types and therefore growth rate crises are treated equally to other types of crises, although some studies (for example, Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001) , and Aziz et al (2000, p.23) , Hutchison and Neuberger (2002) ) use growth rates to measure the costs of other types of crises.
The literature review shows existing crisis studies are ambiguous about conceptual and operational definitions of crises. Thereby the definitions should be clarified. Table 2 shows the summary result of the clarification. 
Balance of Payments Crises
An operational definition of balance of payments crises is rarely found, although most studies agree on the conceptual definition, which is an abrupt loss of international reserves. Several studies (for example, IMF (2000)) examine reserve adequacy levels by using, for example, the reserve to imports ratio (as months of imports) and the short-term external debt to reserve ratio from the viewpoint of the correlation with crisis incidences. However, these ratios do not necessarily fit the conceptual definitions, since these ratios show adequate levels of reserves rather than balance of payments crises per se. Since the essence of balance of payments crises is a decline in reserves, year-on-year growth rates of gross international reserves can be used as an indicator in order to avoid seasonal fluctuations.
(5)
Banking Crises
Banking crises can be divided into liquidity and solvency crises. As the essence of liquidity type banking crises is bank runs, deposit figures especially demand deposits seem to be an appropriate indicator.
Demand deposits are more suitable than time deposits, since time deposits are tied in certain periods and difficult to cancel before maturity. Therefore, time deposits may not properly capture bank run situations.
In order to measure a solvency problem of the banking system, capital figures are used as an indicator.
Demand deposits and capital account figures are adjusted by the ratio in total assets. This is because absolute levels or growth rates in local currencies are distorted when banking crises are associated with currency crises. Although BIS (Bank for International Settlement) own capital ratio is widely used to measure the healthiness of the banking system, data is difficult to obtain on a timely basis and time -series data is mostly unavailable in developing countries.
Currency Crises
The conceptual definition of currency crises is generally agreed, which is an abrupt depreciation of the currency, though there are two issues such as whether to include unsuccessful currency attacks and whether to choose nominal or real exchange rates. The supporters of the inclusion of unsuccessful currency attacks propose to construct a currency pressure index composed of exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves. However, the supporters do not provide any logical explanations on the inclusion, and the change in international reserves is the concept of balance of payments crises rather than currency crises. Several currency crisis studies mix up balance of payments crises with currency crises. It seems more appropriate to use only successful currency attacks. Therefore only exchange rates should be used as an indicator.
In relation to the second issue, following the conceptual definition, nominal exchange rates are a suitable indicator regardless of the reasons behind the depreciation such as hyperinflation, political situation and macroeconomic conditions. (7) At the same time, real exchange rates are informative as the comparison between nominal and real exchange rates can be a clue for the cause of depreciation.
Debt Crises
Finding an indicator fully compatible with the conceptual definition of external debt crises, which is inability to service debts, is difficult. Debt related indicators show the severity of debt burden rather than inability to service debts. Paris Club debt rescheduling and/or debt reduction are implemented when a country faces external debt repayments difficulties. However, Paris Club deals with only bilateral public debt rather than whole external debt, and sometimes terms of rescheduling and/or debt reduction are politically determined. Therefore the incidences of Paris Club are not necessarily suitable to identify debt crises.
Consequently, the debt burden indicators are used as a proxy for a debt crisis indicator. Among numerous debt indicators, the IMF (2000, p.3 and p.26) states that the external debt to exports ratio is an especially useful indicator of trends in debt and repayment capacity, since the debt to exports ratio is less volatile than the debt to GDP ratio. While both denominator and numerator are measured in the US dollar for the debt to exports ratio, GDP data are basically on a local currency basis and then converted to the US dollar for the debt to GDP ratio. In this sense, the debt to GDP ratio may fluctuate more than the debt to exports ratio when exchange rates are unstable. In order to verify whether the debt to exports ratio is less volatile than the debt to GDP ratio, the standard deviation of two indicators of fifteen countries (8) are calculated between Q1 1980 and Q4 2002 depending on data availability. In eleven countries out of fifteen, the debt to GDP ratio is more volatile than the debt to exports ratio. Although arrears are one of the key indicators of debt burdens (Non-Aligned Movement Ad Hoc Advisory Group of Experts on Debt (1994), Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001)), data on arrears are difficult to obtain on a quarterly basis.
Growth Rate Crises
Conceptual and operational definitions of growth rate crises are rarely found in various studies, although as a rule of thumb NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) defines a US recession when seasonally adjusted quarterly growth rates are negative for two straight quarters. Bruno (1996, p.1) defines growth crises as "at least three consecutive years of negative growth (cumulating in a drop in growth of at least nine percent)." Here, conceptually growth rate crises can be defined as a sharp decline in real outputs.
Operationally real economic growth rates on a year-on-year basis can be used as an indicator, since seasonally adjusted figures are not often available in emerging economies.
Financial Crises
There is no consensus on conceptual and operational definitions of financial crises. However from various studies, the essence of financial crises is 'an abrupt loss of confidence in a country's financial sector'.
When a country faces a loss of confidence in its financial sector, financial resources abruptly attempt to flee from the country (Sachs and Woo, 2000) . This tendency should be more pronounced in private capital rather than public capital, as public capital often flows into a country in the form of international rescue package when a country faces financial crises. In this sense, operationally, capital flight statistics can be used as an indicator. The core of calculating capital flight is net errors and omissions plus non-FDI net private flows in balance of payments (Loungani and Mauro, 2001 ). One issue is whether to include current transfer in the current account, since this item includes private remittance (Caves, Frankel and Jones, 1996) . The decision whether to include the current transfer sometimes makes significant differences on the crisis identification.
For example, the inclusion of the current transfer cannot identify the 2001 Argentina as financial crises,
while the exclusion identifies the periods as financial crises. As the 2001 Argentina crisis is often characterized as abrupt capital outflows, the current transfer is excluded from capital flight.
Data and Methodology
The main data sources are the IMF' These four steps enable us to identify the periods experiencing crises. Crisis period identification is useful for detailed analysis of crises. However, at the same time, the crisis period identification captures spurious signals of the start and end of crises. Then after identifying crisis periods, crisis episodes, which are the core part of crises, are identified using two sets of conditions. The first condition is that there should be at least two types of crises in the same period to pinpoint the start of the crisis episodes. This condition is set to exclude spurious signals of the start of the crisis episodes. As such, all periods with more than two crisis types are included in crisis episodes. The second condition is window periods, and this article sets three quarters window periods based on existing crisis studies. When the period gap between two crisis episodes are less or equal to three quarters, these three quarters are also included in one crisis episode even if these periods has at most one crisis type. This condition is set to exclude spurious signals of the end of the crisis episodes. Fig. 2 illustrates the relationship between crisis periods and crisis episodes with the symbol (? ) denote crisis periods. In period (A), only liquidity type banking crises are identified and therefore this period is not identified as the start of a crisis episode. On the other hand, period (C), period (G) and period (L) has more than two types of crises in one period, and therefore these periods are included in a crisis episode. Although period (D), period (E) and period (F) has less or equal to one crisis identification in one period, the gap between period (C) and period (G) is less or equal to three quarters. Then, period (D), period (E) and period (F) are included in one crisis episode together with period (C) and period (G). On the other hand, the gap between period (G) and period (L) is four periods and then the second condition is not met. Therefore, period (L) is recognized as a different crisis episode. 
Fig. 2: Examples of the Relationship between Crisis Period and Crisis Episode Identifications
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Result
This exercise produces two sets of crisis identifications: crisis period and crisis episode. The four steps identify which quarters experience what types of crises, and the two crisis episode conditions are applied to identify crisis episodes. As a result, eight hundred twenty-seven crisis periods and fifty-nine crisis episodes are identified in fifteen emerging economies between Q1 1980 and Q4 2002. There are three dimensions to observe the results, namely country, crisis type and period.
Country
Each country has contrasting features (Table 3 ). In terms of crisis episodes, total number of crisis episodes is 59 or 3.9 on average. While Turkey has seven crisis episodes, Korea and the Philippines have only two episodes. The total length of crisis episode in Colombia and Turkey is twenty quarters, while it is seven in Malaysia. In Colombia and Turkey, the ratio of crisis episode length to total sample periods is 22 percent or these countries have crisis episodes almost one-fifth of sample periods on average. The total degree of crisis (measured by number of crisis, depth and length) also considerably varies across countries.
The total crisis degree of Argentina exceeds one hundred, while that of India is only forty-one. The
Philippine's case is unique, since the country has only two crisis episodes but at the same time total degree of the crisis is the second highest in the sample countries, which makes the average degree of one crisis (-49) considerably high.
In terms of crisis periods, differences in countries are less obvious than crisis episodes in some countries. For example, Brazil (76) has almost identical number of crisis periods to Argentina (74), and total degree is higher in Brazil than Argentina, which is a sharp contrast with crisis episodes. This means Brazil has many crisis periods which are not included in crisis episodes. In Brazil, between 1980 and 1994, most periods are identified as currency crisis periods, however currency crisis periods were not accompanied by other types of crises in most periods. The country basis analysis shows that some countries such as the Philippines may have more severe crisis episodes (longer and/or deeper cris es) than others. Table 4 provides five selected crisis episodes according to the total degree of cris is. The Philippines' crisis in the early 1980s has the largest degree followed by the Indonesia crisis in the late 1990s. The Philippines crisis was lengthy and continued more than three years. In contrast, the peak degree of crisis was not so large compared to other crisis episodes (Fig. 3) . The second to fourth ranked crisis episodes are observed during the Asian crisis in the late 1990s.
The feature of these crisis episodes is that while the length of crisis was relatively short, peak degree of cris is and accordingly the number of different types of crises at the peak quarter was larger (Fig. 3, Fig. 4 ). 
Crisis
Currency crises are the dominant crises in seven crisis types throughout the sample periods (Table 5) , but the composition of crisis differs in each period. In the crisis period identification, there are 409 quarters experiencing currency crises or 50 percent of total crisis periods (827) followed by 106 growth rate crises or 13 percent of the total. In terms of the ratio in total samples, currency crises account for 29.8 percent, which means on average currency crises are observed in every three quarters. On the other hand, there are only 32 crisis periods with balance of payments crises. The average degree of each type of crises is similar.
Financial crises are the deepest (-2.6), while liquidity type banking crises and debt crises are relatively mild (-2.4) compared to other types of crises. Number of different types of crisis Peak degree of crisis episode
In terms of crisis episodes, in total 177 crises (cumulative) are involved in 59 crisis episodes. On average, one crisis episode carries three crisis types. There are 50 crisis episodes that include currency crises or 85 percent of crisis episodes are associated with currency crises. Debt crises and financial crises also frequently appear in crisis episodes, as these types of crises are observed in about a half of crisis episodes.
On the other hand, balance of payments crises are observed in around 20 percent of total crisis episodes. 
/ Number of appearances in crisis episodes and maximum is 59 2/ Number of periods (quarters) in crisis episodes. Then, 'No. of quarters' gap between crisis periods and episodes shows crisis periods excluded from crisis episodes. Source: Author
The frequency of each type of crises differs in each period (Table 6, Fig 5) . Although currency crises are dominant throughout the periods, their relative frequency declines in the late 1990s. Currency crises account for more than 50 percent of seven crisis types until the early 1990s, but its share declines to 35 percent in the late 1990s. Debt crises become less frequent in the 1990s as well. In the 1980s, debt crises account for 15 percent, while their share declines to five percent in the late 1990s. On the other hand, solvency type banking crises increase their share to 17 percent in the late 1990s, and financial crises double their share in the late 1990s.
The decline in the relative importance of currency crises seems to be consistent with the developments of the exchanger rate regimes. Under the flexible exchange rate regime the risk of abrupt currency deprecation is less compared to the fixed exchange rate regime. In the past, many countries adopted fixed exchange rate and/or managed exchange rate regimes so that to prevent excess fluctuations of the currencies.
According to the IMF (1997, p.79), in 1981 among 113 developing countries 57 countries had pegged exchange rate regimes, 10 countries had limited-flexibility exchange rate regimes and 15 countries had more flexible exchange rate regimes. In 1996, 45 countries had pegged exchange rate regimes, three countries had limited-flexibility exchange rate regimes and 52 countries had more flexible exchange rate regimes. The decline in the relative importance of currency crises is not only the share in total but also the absolute numbers. In 1981-1985 there were 146 currency crisis periods, while there were 61 currency crisis periods in 1996-2000.
The more equal share of each type of crises in the late 1990s may suggest that the relationships between different crisis types become closer than the past. In other words, one crisis type tends to trigger other types of crises more often than the past. 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2002 
Period
The number of crisis periods and episodes declines until the early 1990s, but it increases again in the late 1990s (Table 7 , Fig. 6 ). This is mainly due to the Asian crisis in 1997 and subsequent crises in Latin America in 1998. In the early 1980s, there are 19 crisis episodes in 15 emerging economies. Afterwards, the number of episodes declines to 14 in the late 1980s and seven in the early 1990s. However, the number of episodes increases to 12 in the late 1990s. The average degree of one crisis episode also increases in the late 1990s (Fig. 7) . The average degree of each crisis episode is -22 in the early 1980s, -11 in the late 1980s, Source: Author and -13 in the early 1990s. As such, by the early 1990s, not only the number of crisis episodes falls but also the degree of each crisis declines. However, this trend reverses in the late 1990s. In addition to the increase in the number of crisis episodes, the degree of crisis increases mainly due to the depth of crises rather than their length. 
Crisis Transmission Mechanism
The crisis identification exercise suggests that the relationship between crisis types becomes closer in these days than the past. Existing crisis studies mainly deal with a few types of crises such as currency crises and banking crises. Growth rates are mainly used as a measurement of the degree of crises rather than as a separate type of crises. However, growth rates are not only be affected by other types of crises but also affect other crisis types in turn. Literature review regarding the relationships between crisis types provides rich ideas, though some relationships are rarely found. In theory, there are 42 relationships between seven different types of crises if bidirectional causalities are taken into account. However, only 12 relationships are explained in existing studies. 
Balance of Payments Crises to Financial Crises
Stoker (1995 in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, p. 2)) states that "if not sterilized, this [the loss of reserves] will lead to a credit crunch, increased bankruptcies, and financial crisis."
Balance of Payments Crises to Currency Crises
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, p.2) state "as the current account deficit continues to widen, financial markets become convinced that the stabilization program is unsustainable, fueling an attack against the domestic currency."
Banking Crises to Currency Crises
Obstfeld (1994, in Glick and Hutchison (1999, p. 3)) argues that "a weak banking sector may precipitate a currency crisis if rational speculators anticipate that policy makers will choose inflation over exchange rate stability in order to avoid bankruptcies and further strains on banking sector rather than endure the costs of defending domestic currency." Valasco (1987) and Calvo (1987) (in Glick and Hutchison (1999, p. 3) argue that "a bank run can cause a currency attack if the increased liquidity associated with a government bailout of the banking system is inconsistent with a stable exchange rate." Gonzales-Hermosillo (1996, in Glick and Hutchison (1999, p. 3)) shows that "a bank crisis may lead to a currency crisis in a poorly developed financial system where agents may substitute foreign assets for domestic assets." Kaufman (2000, p.13) Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001, pp.7-8) state that "if the banking sector is not sound or is already experiencing a crisis around the time of the currency crisis, the supply of credit to domestic firms is likely to get disrupted. With devaluation adversely affecting the balance sheets of their clients and with a rise in non-performing loans, banks may roll back their lending activities or go bankrupt."
Banking Crises / Currency Crises to Growth Rate Crises
Banking Crises to Growth Rate Crises
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, p.2) assert that "banking crises disrupt the flow of credit to households and enterprises, reducing investment and consumption and possibly forcing viable firms into bankruptcy."
Banking Crises to Financial Crises
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, p.2) assert that "banking crisis may also jeopardize the functioning of the payments system and, by undermining confidence in domestic financial institutions, they may cause a decline in domestic saving and/or a large scale capital outflows." Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, p.2) conclude that "the peak of banking crisis most often comes after the currency crash, suggesting that existing problems were aggravated or new ones created by the high interest rates required to defend the exchange rate peg or the foreign exchange exposure of banks." Mishkin (1996 in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, p. 2)) argues that "if a devaluation occurs, the position of banks could be weakened further if a large share of their liabilities is denominated in a foreign currency." Miller (1996 in Glick and Hutchison (1999, p. 3)) shows that "a speculative attack on a currency can lead to a bank crisis if deposit money is used to speculate in the foreign exchange market and banks are loomed up." Glick and Hutchison (1999, p. 3) state "a currency shock can adversely alter the banking sector directly by causing a deterioration of bank balance sheets if the currency depreciates, or indirectly by causing the central bank to raise interest rates to defend the currency."
Currency Crises to Banking Crises
Financial Crises to Banking Crises
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, p.2) assert that "since the boom is usually financed by a surge in bank credit, as banks borrow abroad, when capital inflows become outflows and asset markets crash, the banking system caves in."
Currency Crises to Debt Crises
Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001, p.6) state that "when a large part of the liabilities of the domestic firms are denominated in foreign currency, a sudden devaluation leads to an overnight increase in their debt burden." Kaufman (2000, p.13) states that "currency crises characterized by a sharp depreciation in exchange rates are likely to increase both the burden of debt denominated in foreign currency to domestic borrowers and the probability of default on such debt."
Debt Crises to Growth Rate Crises
Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001, p.6) state that "this [debt burden due to currency devaluation] in turn, almost immediately impacts their balance sheet, and makes it virtually impossible for them to raise new loans to make debt repayments. The debt overhang can be expected to reduce aggregate investment and economic activities." Rodrik and Velasco (2000 in Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001, p.6) ) argue that "difficulties in rolling over short-term debt during currency crises could squeeze the liquidity available within the economy and shrink the level of economic activities." Kaminsky (1999, p.7) argue that "capital flight has been shown to have caused an erosion of the tax base and a reduction in domestic investment…" Kaminsky (1999, p.7) argue that "as it [capital flight] leads to a build up of gross foreign debt, it can fuel a currency crisis as foreign investors become doubtful about the ability and the will of the emerging economies to pay back."
Financial Crises to Growth Rate Crises
Financial Crises to Currency Crises
Data and Methodology
Seven crisis types, in theory, produce 42 combinations of relationships, since the relationships are not unidirectional but bidirectional causality. In order to analyze the relationships, the standardized scores obtained for the crisis identification exercise are used. First, the correlation analysis of seven crisis types in 15 countries is conducted to capture a broad picture of the relationships. Although correlation coefficients are useful, they cannot clarify causality between crisis indicators.
Afterwards, Grander causality test is conducted for five East Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), as these countries were severely affected by the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. 
Result
Correlation Coefficients
The results of the correlation analysis (Table 8) With regard to the combination of crisis types, the relationship between liquidity type banking crises and currency crises is significantly correlated in 11 countries and of them 10 are positive. And the relationship between currency crises and growth rate crises is positively correlated in 10 countries. These suggest that liquidity type banking crises tends to be associated with currency crises (Section 3.1.3 and 3.1.7 above) and currency crises tend to be associated with growth rate crises, although the causality is not clarified.
Moreover, these results imply, for example, that liquidity type banking crises and currency crises are susceptible to the same factors such as political instability. For example, if political instability leads to currency depreciation, people may want to keep cash in hand for emergency. On the other hand, the relationship between debt crises and financial crises is significant in only three countries and all of them are negative. The negative relationship does not necessarily seem illogical. If debt crises are caused by the increase in debt outstanding rather than the decline in exports, this implies capital (in the form of borrowing) flows into a country, and this is inconsistent with financial crises which show capital flight. The negative significant relationships are important, too. For example, if a country tries to defend the currency by using its international reserves and succeed, an appreciation of the currency could be associated with the decline in international reserves. 
I (0) denotes the order of integration is zero, and I (1) denotes the order of integration is one Source: Author
Granger causality test finds twenty-five significant relationships with five percent confidence level between crisis types (Table 10) or 12 percent of total number of relationships of 210 (42 relationships in five countries) shows Granger causality. On a crisis basis, eight relationships or one-third of total start from currency crises. Although the sample period covers since 1980, this observation is consistent with the widely-shared view that the Asian crisis was triggered from the abrupt currency depreciation. Also there are five significant relationships starting from balance of payments crises. However, there are only one significant relationship starting from growth rate crises, and this implies that growth rate crises do not tend to lead to other types of crises. On a result basis or which types of crises are affected more than others, each crisis is almost equally affected. Growth rate crises are the result in five relationships, and solvency type banking crises, balance of payments crises, currency crises and debt crises are the results in three relationships.
On a country basis, Indonesia has eight significant Granger causality relationships, followed by Korea (7).
On the other hand, Malaysia and the Philippines have three significant Granger causality relationships.
There are only two bidirectional relationships. One is the balance of payments and currency crises in Indonesia. The other is currency crises and financial crises in Korea. Crisis periods are identified based on standardized scores, since one of the most important features of crises is an 'abrupt' change in economic indicators, and crisis episodes are further identified based on two sets of conditions to exclude false signals of crisis period identifications. One is that at least two crisis types are required to pinpoint the start of a crisis episode. The other is that three quarter window periods are introduced to pinpoint the end of a crisis episode.
The main findings from crisis identification are: (iv) The number of crisis episodes declines by the early 1990s, but it increases in the late 1990s due to the Asian crisis and Latin America crisis. The severity of crisis measured by the depth (i.e. deviation from the crisis threshold) and length is the severest in the late 1990s.
The relationships and transmission mechanisms are analyzed based on correlation coefficients for all 15 countries. Afterwards, the Granger causality test is conducted for five Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand). The main findings are:
The East Asian countries have higher number of positive relationships between crisis types than other countries;
(ii) The relationship between liquidity type banking crises and currency crises is positive in eleven countries out of 15 followed by the 10 relationships between currency crises and growth rate crises.
These result suggests that currency crises tend to be associated with liquidity type banking crises and growth rate crises;
(iii) Granger causality test of the five Asian countries finds that currency crises tend to trigger other types of crises, and the bidirectional relationships are rarely observed;
Policy recommendations based on the findings are:
(i) Since characteristics of cris is are not identical across countries and periods, policy makers should pay more attention to changing characteristics of crises;
(ii) As the interactions between crises seem to be closer in recent periods, policy makers should prepare policies to mitigate risks of crisis diffusion once one type of crisis is observed. For example, when currency crises are observed, policy makers should assess the risk of the liquidity type banking crises;
(iii) As currency crises tend to lead to other crisis types, exchange rate management is essential. However, recent experiences such as Indonesia in 1998 and Argentina in 2002 suggest that once sharp currency depreciation starts it is difficult to stop the momentum. Therefore , policy makers should be aware of the importance of exchange rate policies even in non-crisis periods.
Notes
(1) Sachs (1998) , Aziz et al (2000) , and IMF (1998) also use the same conceptual definition. In addition, Sachs (1998, p.248) explains banking crises as "commercial banks abruptly lose the ability to roll over market instrument."
(2) For example, Glick and Hutchison (1999) , Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) and Aziz et al. (2000) and Ahluwalia (2000) take this position.
(3) Aziz et al (2000, p.6) and IMF (1998, p.75) use the same conceptual definition (4) Glick and Hutchison (1999) , Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) , Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000) , Moreno and Trehan (2000) , Esquivel and Larrain (1998) , Ahluwalia (2000) , Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1997), Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2000) , Osband and Rijckeghem (2000) (5) In order to verify that gross reserve growth rates are a better indicator than the reserve to imports ratio, a separate analysis is conducted. The analysis shows the ratio cannot well capture widely recognized balance of payments episodes such as the Argentina crisis in 2001-02.
(6) Esquivel and Larrain (1998) take the same position (7) Aziz et al (2000, p.6 ) take the same position (8) The 15 countries are same as the ones used in later in this chapter (9) The identification also depends on the choices of the threshold and sample periods
